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Renz: Restoring Private to Privacy

ESSAY

RESTORING PRIVATE TO PRIVACY
Jeffrey T. Renz*

"With skies that reach from east to west
And room to go and come
I liked my fellow man the best
When he was scattered some."'
It was supposed to be an uneventful continuing legal
education seminar at the Colonial Inn on May 9, 1986. The
subject of the CLE, organized and sponsored by the ACLU of
Montana, was Individual Rights and the Montana Constitution.
Associate Justice Frank Morrison was the last speaker of the
day. His topic was "Analysis of the Independent State Grounds
Doctrine." A discussion period followed.
During the discussion the uneventful became eventful.
Someone began yelling at Frank. I do not remember who. It
was either Ed Dobson or Dennis NettikSimmons. 2 Dobson
*

Director, Criminal Defense Clinic, University of Montana School of Law. Prof.

Renz wrote the ACLU of Montana's amicus curiae brief in support of rehearing State v.
Long.
1. Anonymous, see State v. Long, 216 Mont. 65, 76, 700 P.2d 153, 161 (1985)
(Sheehy, J., dissenting).
2. NettikSimmons had graduated one year before. Dobson was then a law
student. NettikSimmons had been the Montana Law Review's executive editor. Dobson
was to be its business manager. NettikSimmons had written an essay and co-authored
two articles on state constitutional law, including the soon to be published Right of
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recalls being present. 3 Nettiksimmons does not remember being
4
there but agrees that he might have been.
Whoever he was, he was hot about the Supreme Court's
opinion in State v. Long.5 And Justice Morrison had drafted the
Court's opinion.
Long held that the privacy provision of our state
6
constitution, Section 10 of the Montana Declaration of Rights,
proscribed only state action. 7 The majority, over a blistering
dissent from Justice Skeff Sheehy, overruled or disapproved of
eight earlier decisions to the contrary.
The Long opinion was not your usual case. The Court, you
see, had taken the unusual step of establishing its new rule sua
sponte. Neither party argued the issue that the Court decided.
Faced with a line of authority that extended back 34 years to the
time when Griff Pritchard decided to camp out in Frank and
Katherine Welsh's parlor,8 the State did not argue that the right
of privacy did not apply to private actors. Long, of course, did
not address it either. No one saw this one coming.
Montana's right of privacy pre-dates the 1972 Constitution.
In Welsh, the Montana Supreme Court, confronted with the
landlord's novel self-help mechanism, said, "That Pritchard
invaded the privacy and right of privacy of the Welshs is beyond
question." 9
The second pre-1972 case concerned the stereotypical
telephone eavesdropper--the in-laws. 10 In Brecht, the Court held
that because the defendant's sister-in-law had listened in on an
extension phone the prosecution could not use her testimony
recounting Brecht's threats to his soon-to-be-late wife. This, the

Privacy.

See Larry M. Elison & Dennis NettikSimmons, Federalism and State

Constitutions: The New Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45 MONT.

L. REV. 177 (1984); Dennis NettikSimmons, Towards a Theory of State Constitutional
Jurisprudence,46 MONT. L. REV. 261 (1985); Larry M. Elison & Dennis NettikSimmons,
Right of Privacy, 48 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1987). Dobson had just authored a case note on
the Long decision. See Edward MacDonald Dobson, Note, Search by Private Persons:
State v. Long, 47 MONT. L. REV. 189 (1986).
3. Personal communication with Ed Dobson (Aug. 13, 2002).
4. Personal communication with Dennis NettikSimmons (Aug. 14, 2002).
5. State v. Long, 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
6. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
7. 216 Mont. at 71, 700 P.2d at 157.
8. Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952). Pritchard wanted to
evict his tenants but they were uncooperative about leaving. Pritchard decided that the
best way to get them out was for him to move in. So he did.
9. 125 Mont. at 524, 241 P.2d at 819.
10. State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
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Court concluded, violated Brecht's right to privacy. It mattered
little that the sister-in-law was not a state actor. The Court
said, "To distinguish between classes of violators is tantamount
to destruction of the right itself.""
Up to this point (and keep in mind that we had not written
the 1972 Constitution yet) the Court had developed both
common law and federal privacy/due process rights that it
applied to protect people against non-governmental privacy
invasions. Then came the shining beacon.
Delegate Bob Campbell (who, with Delegate Dorothy Eck,
were Montana's answer to James Madison) authored Section 10.
Campbell was prescient. He foresaw the vast data gathering
capabilities of the private sector and said this on the Convention
floor in 1972, not long after I bought a new slide rule:
[P]olitical organizations, private information gathering firms, and
even an individual can now snoop more easily and more effectively
than ever before. We certainly hope that such snooping is not as
widespread as some persons would have us believe, but with
technology easily available and becoming more refined all the
time, prudent safeguards against the misuse of such technology
are needed. 12

With that, the Convention and the people of Montana
approved a document that said, without equivocation, "The right
of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free
society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest."1 3 This became the model for similar
rights now found in the constitutions of other states and foreign
nations.
What elegance! What precision! What happened?
Would the delegates' repeated references to private firms,
collection agencies, and credit bureaus and its silence about
overruling 20 years of authority persuade the Court that private
actions were covered? In fact, they did. In a series of post-1972
decisions, the Court applied the exclusionary rule to exclude
evidence discovered by prospective house buyers who liked to
peek under beds, 14 self-deputized restaurant managers who
searched their employees' clothing, 15 a snoop who entered his
neighbor's garden to trim marijuana leaves, 16 and managers of a
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

157 Mont. at 270, 485 P.2d at 51.
5 MONT. CONST. CONV. TR. 1681 (1972).
MONT. CONST. art II, § 10.
State v. Hyem, 193 Mont. 51, 630 P.2d 202 (1981).
State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974).
State v. Helfrich, 183 Mont. 484, 600 P.2d 816 (1979).
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mini-storage unit who pulled the hinges of a storage unit to
17
discover why its renter had a gun earlier in the day.
In light of these cases, it would seem that a new landlord
snooping case, especially considering the history of Griff
Pritchard's camping trip to his tenant's parlor, would pose
nothing new. But Millard Hultgren's tour of his tenant's attic,
to satisfy his curiosity about his tenant's electricity bill, was to
result in the chagrin and anger displayed by (those who I
remember to be) the Montana Law Review's finest.
The Long majority concluded that the plain language of
Section 10 dictated its outcome. The provision's exception,
"without the showing of a compelling state interest," became the
tail that bit the dog. Section 4's18 express referral to "person,
firm, corporation, or institution," Section 10's silence in this
regard, and Section 10's reference to state interest, wrote Justice
Morrison, commanded the conclusion that Section 10 applied
only to state actors. 19
At the CLE. Morrison defended the decision against the
impassioned Colonial attack. He pointed out that the 1972
ballot language also did not refer to private actors. Then rose
another commentator for the kill. 20 The voters' pamphlet, this
speaker pointed out, said it very clearly. 2 1 Morrison, mortally
wounded by this blow, conceded the point: "If only this had been
called to our attention."22 Justice Sheehy, in the audience, sat
back, smiling, and enjoyed the show.
Alas, Bob Campbell was not prescient enough. Section 10
should have read:
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being
of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing
of a compelling state interest and this means you, Griff
Pritchard!

17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.

State v. Van Haele, 199 Mont. 522, 649 P.2d 1311 (1982).
MONT CONST. art II, § 4.
Long, 216 Mont. at 70, 700 P.2d at 156-157.
This, I remember to be Ed Dobson.
See Dobson, supra note 3, at 195 n.41.
(or words to that effect.)
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